Truman's Obvious Choice Using the atomic bomb on Japan was the fastest way to produce a victory with the lowest cost in American lives?

 





in the summer of 1945, the most important and troubling problem that President Harry Truman faced was how to end the war against Japan on satisfactory terms as quickly as possible. It was clear to American – and Japanese – leaders that Japan could not win the war. But Truman and his advisers still faced the formidable task of forcing a Japanese surrender, and the prospects for an early victory were grimly uncertain, even against a badly weakened enemy.

The Japanese government was sharply divided. One faction favored surrendering on the sole condition that the emperor, Hirohito, be allowed to remain on his throne. A competing faction of militants insisted not only that the status of the emperor be affirmed but also that Japan should fight on in hopes of securing better surrender terms, even at a loss of tens of millions of Japanese lives. Hirohito vacillated between the opposing views without taking a clear position.

With the Japanese government paralyzed by indecision, policy makers in Washington weighed their options for achieving final victory. They considered several approaches that might persuade the Japanese to surrender. The options included modifying the U.S. policy of demanding an unconditional surrender, waiting for the Soviet Union to launch an attack on Japanese-controlled Manchuria, and continuing the naval blockade and massive conventional bombing of Japanese cities that had killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and imposed immense hardships on the survivors. Those methods were burdened by the potential drawbacks of prolonging the war, undermining domestic support for a complete victory, encouraging the Japanese militants or expanding Soviet power in east Asia.

The least desirable means of forcing a surrender was an invasion of the Japanese mainland. At a meeting with high-ranking military leaders on June 18, Truman authorized a landing on the Japanese island of Kyushu in November 1945. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall argued convincingly that an invasion would end the war more surely and more quickly than other alternatives. But an invasion was a dreaded contingency because military experts estimated that the price would be tens of thousands of deaths among American soldiers and sailors (though, contrary to later claims, they did not tell Truman that an invasion would cause hundreds of thousands of American fatalities).

Another possible means of ending the war – the atomic bomb – was known to only a few top officials. By July 1945, it was apparent that two bombs of different designs would soon be available for deployment against Japan. The advantages of the new weapon made its use an easy and obvious decision for Truman. The bomb might speed the end of the war without an invasion and without taking the risks the other options presented. Truman's guiding motive was to force a surrender at the earliest possible moment to save American lives. The precise number of lives was not a concern; he wanted to reduce American casualties to zero. The Japanese had given no indication that they were ready to stop fighting, and Truman authorized the bomb because it appeared to offer the most likely way to produce an American victory on American terms with the lowest cost in American lives.

The atomic bomb accomplished Truman's primary objective. The attack on Hiroshima finally convinced Hirohito that the war must end, and his long-delayed conclusion was the decisive step in bringing about a Japanese surrender. Without the atomic bomb, the war would have continued at a cost in American lives that Truman and the public he served would have found unacceptable.